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Abstract
This paper attempts to clarify the significance of reforms to disability
benefits proposed by the New Labour government in 1998, by setting
them in the context of the development of disability benefits since the
early 1970s. The first section charts the creation, extension and
subsequent series of reforms of disability benefits, and shows that while
‘compensatory’ benefits like Industrial Injuries benefit have played a
steady role, ‘extra costs’ benefits like Disability Living Allowance have
become an increasingly significant component. Expansion of benefits
designed to replace earnings was followed by a contraction in the 1990s,
the latter phase accompanied by an increasing emphasis on ‘targeting’.
The following section details the latest reforms. These two sections are
brought together using hypothetical case studies to illustrate the
changing balance between different kinds of benefit – the ‘benefit basket’
– for disabled people, from before the introduction of specific disability
benefits through to the system as it might be in 2001. The paper
concludes that, in accordance with the guiding principle of welfare
reform, “work for those who can and security for those who cannot”, the
government’s reforms are designed to reward paid employment, while
offering relatively generous provision for those who are obviously
unable to work. The question raised is the extent to which altered
incentives will be sufficiently powerful to eliminate the category in-
between – those who are deemed capable of work but who do not have a
job – or whether large numbers of disabled people will fall between the
stools of “work” and “security”.
1Introduction
In late 1998, the government published a consultation paper on changes
to disability benefits, as part of its broader programme of welfare reform
(DSS, 1998a). Media coverage of the proposals was unexpectedly
enthusiastic – or at least uncritical – with the Guardian reporting that the
Secretary of State for Social Security, Alistair Darling, “won plaudits
from the disability lobby and drew a cheer in the commons” (Brindle
and Ward, 1998). Cuts to the main benefits which had been anticipated
did not materialise and the controversial programme of re-assessing
claims to extra-costs benefits was scrapped, while additional resources
were promised to some severely disabled people, especially children.
However, by the time the proposals were before Parliament as part of
the Welfare Reform and Pensions Bill (House of Commons, 1999),
several major disability groups had resigned from the official advisory
body, and the government suffered an even greater revolt by back-
benchers than it had done over the lone parent benefit cuts the previous
year.
This paper attempts to clarify the significance of the New Labour
reforms by setting them in the context of the development of disability
benefits since the early 1970s. The first section charts the creation,
extension and subsequent series of reforms of disability benefits, and
looks at trends in overall expenditure. The following section details the
latest reforms and raises some questions about the extent to which they
are likely to achieve their stated objectives. These two sections are
brought together using hypothetical case studies to illustrate the
changing balance between different kinds of benefit – the ‘benefit basket’
– for disabled people, from before the introduction of specific disability
benefits through to the system as it might be in 2001. The paper
concludes with an assessment of the extent to which the latest reforms
represent a continuation of the evolution of disability benefits or a break
with the past.
Evolution of disability benefits
That there has been a dramatic growth in expenditure on benefits for
disabled people is now widely recognised, but the magnitude of that
growth – illustrated in Figure 1 – may still be surprising to some:
expenditure has more than trebled since 1974. Means-tested benefits
2(Income Support and its predecessor, Supplementary Benefit) paid to
sick and disabled people have risen particularly sharply, from £600
million in 1979 to £3,500 million in 1997 (in 1995/6 prices).1 Social
security as a whole was growing over the period, but even so,
expenditure on disability benefits increased its share from 16 to 27 per
cent (Figure 2).
                                          
1 Does not include Housing Benefit or local tax benefits.
Figure 1: Total expenditure on benefits for disabled 
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Note: Includes Supplementary Benefit and Income Support paid to sick and
disabled people, but not Housing Benefit or local tax benefits.
Sources: DSS (1998b), DSS (1998c), Evans (1998).
3These overall trends mean little without understanding the
benefits which go to make up the total, and how these changed over the
period. The constituent benefits are designed to meet a number of
different objectives and are paid to people in a wide range of
circumstances. It may be helpful to group them into four categories
(following Berthoud, 1998):
Compensatory benefits: for individuals who have become sick or disabled
as a result of ‘serving the nation’ whether in a military or ordinary
occupational capacity. They are tax-free and are not means-tested,
although some are taken into account when assessing income for other
means-tested benefits. Industrial Injuries Disablement Benefit (IIDB) and
War Disability Pension (WDP) are the main examples.
Figure 2: Expenditure on benefits for disabled as 
percentage of total social security, 1974-1997
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4Earnings replacement benefits: to provide an income for individuals unable
to earn as a result of sickness or disability. They may be short or long
term, and may or may not be tied to previous employment. They were
originally tax-free but are now mostly taxable.2 They are not means-
tested but are taken into account when assessing income for other
means-tested benefits. Currently benefits of this kind include Statutory
Sick Pay (SSP), Incapacity Benefit (IB), Severe Disablement Allowance
(SDA), and Invalid Care Allowance (ICA). Various predecessors were
known as Sickness Benefit (SB), Invalidity Benefit (IVB) and Non-
Contributory Invalidity Pension (NCIP).
Extra costs benefits: to provide help towards additional costs incurred as a
result of disability. They are tax-free and not means-tested, and they are
ignored when assessing income for other means-tested benefits.
Attendance Allowance (AA) and Disability Living Allowance (DLA) are
the main benefits of this kind currently available; an earlier equivalent
was Mobility Allowance (MobA).
Means-tested benefits: to top up income to a minimum level, the exact
level being determined by the number of people in the household, any
special needs, and housing costs. These are not strictly-speaking
disability benefits although disabled people may receive them and be
eligible for additional premiums. They currently include Income
Support (IS), Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit; the main
predecessor was known as Supplementary Benefit (SuppBen). Disability
Working Allowance (DWA) is an in-work means-tested benefit designed
to top up earnings of disabled workers; an equivalent for non-disabled
workers with children is Family Credit.
Compensatory benefits were the first to be introduced, indeed the
War Disability Pension, created after the First World War, was one of the
earliest social security benefits altogether.3 Industrial Injuries
Disablement Benefit followed in 1948. Because they were designed to
compensate individuals for their disability, the benefits were payable in
                                          
2 The rationale for their tax-free status is unclear: other earnings-replacement
benefits such as unemployment benefit and the retirement pension were
taxable from the outset.
3 This section draws on a number of accounts of the development of disability
benefits in the UK, including Berthoud (1998), Evans (1998), and Walker and
Walker (1991).
5addition to any earnings or other income and were set at a relatively
generous level. Despite this – and perhaps thanks to well-organised
lobbies of recipients (or potential recipients in the case of IIDB) – they
have to date remained largely unchanged, although various
supplements and allowances on IIDB were phased out from the mid-
1980s.
Earnings replacement benefits have a more chequered history.
Prior to 1971, those unable to work due to sickness or disability were
generally not distinguished from other non-workers, and simply
received means-tested assistance, if they were poor enough. In that year
and the following one, Invalidity Pension and Invalidity Allowance
were introduced (together known as Invalidity Benefit, IVB), providing
an age-related income to those who left employment due to sickness or
disability and who had a sufficient National Insurance contributions
record. Four years later an equivalent benefit was created for those who
did not have a contributions record, known as Non-Contributory
Invalidity Pension. It was paid at a much lower level and housewives
were not initially eligible. When they became so in 1977, it was on such
unfavourable terms that it was declared discriminatory against women,
and the benefit was replaced in 1984 with Severe Disablement
Allowance. SDA, though still paid at a much lower level than its
equivalent contributory benefit, does not distinguish between ex-
employees with poor contribution records (often men) and those who
work in the home (often women).
Running alongside the development of an earnings-replacement
benefit for disabled non-employees was progress on providing an
income for carers. The original Invalid Care Allowance was introduced
just a year later than NCIP in 1976, but like NCIP, was initially fairly
restricted in scope. It was extended to non-relatives with caring
responsibilities in 1981 and finally to married women caring for their
spouses in 1987.
The 1970s and 1980s were in general periods of expansion and
improvement in the coverage of earnings-replacement benefits.
However the tide did begin to turn. First in 1980 all long-term benefits,
including IVB, were linked to prices rather than being up-rated with
earnings as they had been previously. Then through the 1980s short-
term sickness benefits became flat-rate (losing their earnings-related
element) and responsibility for them was gradually passed to
employers. Finally, and decisively, Incapacity Benefit (IB) replaced IVB
in 1995: taxable, unlike its predecessor, and with tougher eligibility
criteria. For IVB, assessments of incapacity for work could take into
6account the claimant’s age and qualifications, but for long-term IB the
test (at least in theory) is whether there is any work the claimant could
perform, regardless of the likelihood of him or her getting such a job or
its suitability.
The development of extra costs benefits appears to be one of
relatively few areas where social research has had a direct impact on
policy. A pioneering survey undertaken by the Office of Population
Censuses and Surveys (OPCS) in 1968 identified 3 million disabled
adults living in private households. It provided evidence of widespread
poverty, and of the sorts of additional expenditure incurred as a result of
disability (Harris, 1971). In 1971, Attendance Allowance was introduced
for those who required significant amounts of personal assistance,
followed in 1975 by Mobility Allowance for those who needed help
getting about.
In the late 1980s however further surveys by the OPCS showed
that disabled people were still incurring substantial assistance and
mobility costs that were not being met by existing benefits (Martin and
White, 1988) – ‘horizontal equity’ between the disabled and non-
disabled population was not being achieved. In particular, benefits for
those with the most severe impairments were found to be inadequate,
while those with less severe impairments were often getting nothing at
all. Hence in 1992, extra costs benefits were reformed, with Disability
Living Allowance replacing MobA and AA for the under-65s. The
lowest rates became payable to those with fewer but nevertheless
significant requirements, and the highest rates were made more
generous than those of its forerunners.
The evolution of means-tested benefits for sick and disabled
people has mirrored the development of both the earnings-replacement
and extra-costs strands. In the first instance, sickness and disability were
not differentiated from other reasons for being out of work: National
Assistance was paid at the same rate regardless of the cause of your
claim. Supplementary Benefit incorporated a more generous rate of
benefit from 1966 for those out of work long-term, including the sick and
disabled. Extra payments for special needs such as personal assistance or
additional heating were discretionary, and although some acquired legal
status through legislation in the 1960s and 1970s, they still required a
detailed examination of each individual case. Income Support replaced
SuppBen in 1986, simplifying the means-test and creating premiums
based on entitlement to extra-costs benefits rather than on a separate
investigation of an individual’s circumstances. Evans and others (1994)
have shown that in addition to regularising entitlement, IS premiums
7resulted in higher levels of benefit for disabled claimants than under the
old system. So as means-testing has evolved, disability has become more
explicitly recognised by the system, and the levels of extra payments for
disability have been gradually increased.
Figure 3 illustrates the very different contributions these four
components – compensatory benefits, earnings replacement, extra costs
and means-tested benefits – have made to the overall growth in
disability benefit expenditure. Compensatory benefits (IIDB and WDP)
have continued at much the same level throughout the period. Extra
costs benefits exhibited a steady growth from the early 1970s through to
the introduction of DLA in 1992, when expenditure on them increased
sharply and has continued to increase year on year. Means-tested
benefits stayed relatively flat until the mid-1980s, before accelerating
rapidly, perhaps as a result of cut-backs in earnings replacement benefits
and widening inequality in society as a whole. Finally expenditure on
earnings replacement benefits stayed relatively constant through the
1970s and early 1980s, but then grew significantly until reaching a peak
in 1994/5, flattening and then falling away slightly when IB replaced
Figure 3: Expenditure on benefits for disabled people,
1974-1997, by type of benefit
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Note: ‘Means-tested’ includes Supplementary Benefit and Income Support
paid to sick and disabled people, but not Housing Benefit or local tax benefits.
Sources: DSS (1998b), DSS (1998c), Evans (1998).
8IVB. As a proportion of total expenditure on benefits for disabled
people, compensatory benefits have fallen steadily whilst extra costs
benefits have grown (Figure 4). Means tested benefits initially shrank
but grew again in the late 1980s and 1990s. Earnings replacement
benefits retained a steady share though the 1970s and 1980s, but shrank
in the 1990s.
The history of the creation, extension and reform of disability
benefits, and the related trends in expenditure, tell the same story: a
gradual recognition of the extra costs disabled people face, an expansion
followed by tightening up on benefits designed to replace earnings, the
latter phase accompanied by an increasing emphasis on ‘targeting’, and
a steady role for compensatory benefits – the first specific disability
benefits to be introduced and the only ones never to have been
substantially reformed. In the next section, we turn to the government’s
plans for the future of disability benefits, to examine the extent to which
they represent a continuation of these trends.
Figure 4: Total expenditure on benefits for disabled people by 
type of benefit, 1974-1997
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Note: ‘Means-tested’ includes Supplementary Benefit and Income Support paid
to sick and disabled people, but not Housing Benefit or local tax benefits.
Sources: DSS (1998b), DSS (1998c), Evans (1998).
9The 1999 reforms
The government firmly located its proposals for disability benefits in the
philosophy of ‘welfare to work’, guided by the principle of “work for
those who can and security for those who cannot” (DSS, 1998a).
Throughout the consultation paper, measures to encourage disabled
people into employment are set alongside proposals to direct additional
resources to those most in need.
Specifically, the changes to benefits fall into four groups: firstly,
changes relating to Incapacity Benefit (IB); secondly, those relating to
Severe Disablement Allowance (SDA); thirdly, changes to ‘extra costs’
benefits such as Disability Living Allowance (DLA) and disability
premiums on Income Support (ISdp); and finally, replacing Disability
Working Allowance with a Disabled Person’s Tax Credit (DPTC). The
first three sets of changes are incorporated in the Welfare Reform and
Pensions Bill, and DPTC is created by the Tax Credits Bill. Non-benefit
measures, such as establishing a Disability Rights Commission, are also
planned but they are not discussed here. The current basic rules for the
relevant benefits are as shown in the boxes.4
Incapacity Benefit is designed to replace earnings for those unable to
work due to sickness or disability. It is a non-means-tested, taxable,
contributory benefit, payable to people of working age. For the first 28
weeks it is paid only to those who do not receive Statutory Sick Pay, and
disability is assessed on the basis of ability to carry out ‘own
occupation’. After that time, anyone who has a sufficient contributions
record, and who is assessed as unable to carry out any work, becomes
eligible. The first contribution condition requires the claimant to have
worked (and earned more than a certain minimum) at some point in
their life. The second contribution condition requires that for the last two
years, the claimant has been working (and earning more than a certain
minimum), or has been registered as unemployed, sick, or a carer.5 The
basic long-term rate of IB is currently £64.70 per week and there are
additions for age and dependants.
                                          
4  For further details of current rules, see CPAG (1998a, 1998b).
5  In other words, the conditions exclude those who have never worked, those
who have been working but earning less than the lower limit on
contributions, and those who have been economically inactive but not in such
a way as to be credited  by the Contributions Agency.
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Severe Disablement Allowance is designed to provide an income for
those unable to work due to sickness or disability and who do not
qualify for Incapacity Benefit because of an inadequate contributions
record. It is a non-means-tested, non-taxable, non-contributory benefit
payable to people of working age. To qualify, the claimant must have
been disabled for 28 weeks or more and have become disabled before
the age of 20, or be “80 per cent” disabled. The basic rate  is currently
£39.10 and there are additions for age and dependants.
Disability Living Allowance is designed to help with some of the extra
costs incurred by disabled people. It is a non-means-tested, non-taxable,
non-contributory benefit with two components. The care component is
paid at three rates according to assessed need for supervision and help
with personal care, and can be claimed by anyone whose disability starts
when they are under 65. The mobility component is paid at two rates
according to assessed need for help with getting around and can be
claimed by anyone aged 5 or over whose disability starts when they are
under 65. The lower rate of both components is currently £13.60 per
week; the middle rate for care is £34.30; and the higher rates are £35.85
for mobility and £51.30 for the care component.
Income Support disability premiums are paid in addition to the basic
rate of IS. Disability premium is payable if the claimant is under 60 and
is getting attendance allowance (or the equivalent for industrial or war
injuries), disability working allowance, DLA,  SDA or long-term IB.
Severe disability premium is payable to claimants who are getting
attendance allowance (or the equivalent for industrial or war injuries), or
the middle or higher rates of DLA care component, and who do not have
a spouse or any child aged under 18 living with them, and for whom no-
one receives invalid care allowance. Disabled child premium is payable
if the claimant has a child who gets DLA or is blind. The current rate of
IS for a single person aged 25 or over is £50.35 per week, on top of which
disability premium is £21.45 per week, on top of which severe disability
premium is £38.50. The disabled child premium is £21.45 per week.
11
Disability Working Allowance tops up the wages of full-time workers
who are disabled. (‘Full-time’ is defined as 16 hours per week or more).
Eligibility is determined by having a disability which puts the individual
at a disadvantage in getting a job, and by receipt of other disability
benefits, either at the time of the claim for DWA (DLA, AA, or
IIDB/WDP increases for attendance needs), or within eight weeks prior
to the claim (IB, SDA or ISdp). An award, once made, lasts for 26 weeks.
For single claimants the maximum basic amount is £50.75 per week plus
£10.80 if working 30 hours per week or more. The amount of benefit is
reduced at a rate of 70p in the £ for any income above £59.25.
Incapacity Benefit
Incapacity Benefit was high on the ‘hit list’ of benefits for reform – in
1997 it cost nearly four times as much in real terms as its predecessor did
in 1974. Moreover, it was perceived to be subsidising unemployment
and early-retirement, and, as a social insurance benefit, insufficiently
targeted on the poor. In the government’s opinion, the rules were
“unfair and outdated” (DSS, 1998a, p.19). However, no direct cuts have
been proposed, nor has its status as an insurance benefit been removed.
Instead, the process of claiming is to be revised, the contribution
conditions are to be modified, and a partial means-test introduced.
Estimated savings are relatively modest at £100 million in the first year
(2001/2) and between £650 and £700 million per year in the longer term.
The changes can be summarised as follows:6
 Continuing assessment of possibility of returning to work: the criteria
for benefit receipt will remain unaltered, but additional
information will be collected focussing on the abilities of the
claimant. New claimants will be allocated a personal adviser and
may be required to attend an interview at the beginning of the
claim, and any time thereafter, to discuss possibilities for returning
to work.
 Contribution condition based on work rather than credits: the first
contribution condition will be changed so that contributions must
have been actually paid in one of the last two years, rather than in
any year. This means anyone who has not worked in the last two
years will be ineligible, although an exception is to be made for
those claiming Invalid Care Allowance, provided they have a
previous work record.
                                          
6 Current recipients of IB will not be affected.
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 Income from private pensions taken into account: income from an
occupational or personal pension, or from a Permanent Health
Insurance policy arranged by an employer, will be taken into
account when assessing the amount of Incapacity Benefit a
claimant will receive.7 The amount of benefit will be reduced by 50
per cent of any income from these sources over £50 per week.
Much was made in the run up to the publication of the proposals
of the idea that a new test for Incapacity Benefit would focus on what
claimants could do rather than what they could not. It was always going
to be difficult to design a test of abilities which did not at the same time
test inabilities, and indeed details of the new test have yet to be
determined. However it seems that the most significant change will be
the appointment of a personal adviser to oversee each claim, review it at
intervals (possibly requiring the claimant to attend for interview) and
develop, where appropriate, a plan for getting the claimant back to
work. This approach fits with the overall ‘welfare to work’ strategy
begin pursued by the government, and goes some way to addressing the
concern that incapacity benefits tend to act as a one way street – the
longer claimants spend on the benefit, the harder it is to move into work
(Berthoud, 1993).
On contribution conditions, the government may be responding to
the fear that incapacity has in some cases become a form of disguised
unemployment. From the recipient’s point of view, IB may be a more
attractive proposition than JSA since it is paid at a higher rate, and from
the point of view of the Employment Service, there may in the past have
been pressure to classify people as sick to keep the claimant
unemployment count low. The Bill attempts to block this route onto IB
by restricting eligibility to those who have actually worked and paid
contributions in the last two years (as opposed to being credited with
contributions, for example while unemployed). It will no longer be
possible to go from being unemployed onto IB.
Clearly the government’s intention is that those who are fit for
work should be subject to the ‘carrots and sticks’ of the Jobseekers
Allowance regime, rather than languishing on IB. However it is possible
that the effect of the change in rules would be to encourage those
                                          
7 Permanent Health Insurance provides a replacement income when earnings
are interrupted by an extended period of sickness or disability. A group
policy may be purchased by employers on behalf of employees. PHI policies
purchased by individuals will be exempt from this provision.
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claimants who could be classified either as unemployed or incapacitated
to go straight from work onto IB, without an intervening spell of job-
seeking, in order to avoid making themselves ineligible for IB. Which
way the incentive will operate is an open question.
A further potential problem is that the reform may deny IB not
only to those who should really be classified as unemployed, but also to
those who genuinely become sick or disabled after a period of
unemployment – and there is a considerable body of evidence which
suggests that long-term unemployment contributes to ill health.8 The
only alternative to IB for those unable to work will be Income Support.
Finally, IB will be means-tested for those in receipt of private
pension or insurance income. This tackles another route onto the benefit
which is perceived to be illegitimate, namely early retirement. It is
thought that especially older men may be using IB as a way of
smoothing their way into retirement, with little or no intention of
returning to work, and there is some evidence to support this view
(Rowlingson and Berthoud, 1998). Under the new rules, someone who
retires early on a private pension or sickness insurance will have their
state incapacity benefit reduced at a rate of 50 pence in the pound.9 As a
rough guide, a teacher retiring aged 55 with an occupational pension
could expect to have all his or her IB withdrawn.
Again however there is a risk that the incentives may not operate
in the way the government envisages. The reform effectively reduces the
value of existing and future private pension and insurance
arrangements, discouraging people from making such investments. This
sits oddly with the government’s stated intention to encourage private
provision – one of the leading principles of welfare reform as a whole.
Severe Disablement Allowance
Abolition of Severe Disablement Allowance was a surprise component
of the government’s proposals. The main changes are:
 No benefit for those who become disabled after the age of 20: existing
claimants of SDA will be protected, but anyone who becomes
newly disabled after the age of 20 will not be eligible for SDA. If
their assets and income are sufficiently low, and they do not have
                                          
8 For a review, see Grayson (1986).
9 To avoid claimants intentionally deferring pension receipt to maximise their
IB entitlement, the DSS will have the power to take into account ‘notional
income’ from a pension which could have been claimed but was not.
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a working partner, they may be able to claim Income Support
instead.
 Incapacity Benefit for those disabled before the age of 20: those
who are disabled before the age of 16 will become eligible for
Incapacity Benefit (despite not having a contributions record)
rather than receiving SDA. This will also apply to  those who
become disabled aged 16-19 provided they are not in full-time
education.10 Long-term IB is paid at a higher rate than SDA, and
should raise most recipients above Income Support level.
According to the government, these two measures are designed
“to modernise Severe Disablement Allowance, to direct more help to
those for whom it was intended” (DSS, 1998a, p.9), implying that the
purpose of SDA was to support those disabled in childhood. In fact,
SDA was introduced in 1984 to replace the Non-Contributory Invalidity
Pension (NCIP), which, as the name suggests, was the equivalent of the
invalidity pension for those with an inadequate contributions record. It
is therefore best understood as an earnings-replacement benefit,
although it may be the lack of potential to earn or engage in other
productive activity that is being compensated, rather than the loss of any
actual earnings. The age at which a disability is acquired is irrelevant to
the principle of SDA, except in so far as the younger you are, the less
likely you are to have made sufficient National Insurance contributions.
The consultation paper states that those aged 20 or over will have had
the chance to earn and therefore should be eligible for Incapacity Benefit,
but that appears to ignore the range of activities in which people may be
engaged – bringing up a family, being a carer, studying, being
unemployed – before becoming disabled.
Two-thirds of current SDA claimants became disabled after
reaching the age of 20; new claimants in their situation will be ineligible
for the benefit. In practice, some of them will be able to claim Income
Support and may not lose out to a significant extent financially.
However, 28 per cent of current claimants are above IS levels or have a
partner working more than 16 hours per week, and for them SDA can be
an important contribution to family income (DSS, 1997).
                                          
10 The Government has laid down an amendment to allow people who become
disabled aged 20-24 to claim IB (even without adequate contributions),
provided they were in full-time education immediately prior to their 20th
birthday, and their disability occurs within two years of their course finishing.
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It is not yet clear exactly how the higher rate of benefit for those
who become disabled before the age of 20 will interact with Income
Support and the new Disability Income Guarantee (discussed below). At
present the basic rate of SDA for a single person disabled at any age
under 40 is £52.70 per week, and if this is the individual’s only income,
he or she is better off on Income Support of £71.80 (including disability
premium) or £110.30 (with severe disability premium). Under the new
rules, a single person disabled before the age of 20 would get IB of
£78.30, taking them just above Income Support levels, unless they would
be eligible for a severe disability premium. However, IS receipt also
brings entitlement to other benefits, such as free dental treatment and
prescriptions (in other words IS acts as a “passport” to other benefits), so
if the rate of SDA is only slightly above IS, IS may still be a better option.
The saving from stopping new claims to SDA, net of the extra cost
of paying benefit at a higher rate to new claimants disabled before the
age of 20, is estimated by the government to be £10 million in the first
year, and £100 million per year when it has taken full effect. Although
the cuts are more drastic than those proposed for IB, the net savings are
considerably less, partly due to the smaller caseload and partly due to
the fact that many would-be recipients will get Income Support at a
similar level instead.
‘Extra costs’ benefits
The government is proposing to replace the unpopular Benefits Integrity
Project, which re-assessed claims to Disability Living Allowance and
Attendance Allowance, with a system of regular checks to ensure that
changes in individuals’ circumstances (for better or worse) are taken into
account. There may also in future be a revised claims procedure, but this
is still being researched. In the meantime, two main changes to  benefits
designed to help with the extra costs of disability are included in the Bill,
at an estimated cost to the Treasury of £85 million per year when fully in
force:
 DLA-mobility for 3 and 4 year olds: at present neither higher- nor
lower-rate DLA mobility component can be claimed on behalf of a
child under 5 years old. For the higher rate only, the minimum age
is to be brought down to 3.
 Additional Income Support disability premium: a new premium will
be payable to those who are receiving the highest rate of DLA-care
component, on behalf of themselves or their child, in addition to
the basic disability premium and any other premiums to which
they are entitled. For a single adult or for a child, the new
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premium will be £5.75 per week. So all IS claimants who receive
one of the ‘qualifying benefits’ (see box above) will get disability
premium of £21.45 per week, in addition to which those receiving
highest rate of DLA-care will get the new premium of £5.75, in
addition to which those who qualify for severe disability premium
(i.e. those who are receiving higher or middle rate of DLA-care
and who do not live with any non-dependants and for whom no-
one receives Invalid Care Allowance) will get £38.50 per week.
These premiums are all paid on top of the basic IS rate, currently
£50.35 for a single adult aged 25 or over.
The extension of higher-rate DLA-mobility to 3 and 4 year olds
was prompted by research showing possible detrimental effects on a
child’s development of not having mobility aids at a young age
(Disability Alliance, 1995), and has for many years been the subject of
campaigns by disability groups.
The additional IS premium, termed a “Disability Income
Guarantee” in the consultation document, is a relatively modest increase
in means-tested benefits for some severely disabled people. It will
however be payable in addition to other premiums and extra-costs
benefits like DLA and goes some way to meeting the gap between
identified additional needs of severely disabled people and the benefit
income to which they are entitled.
Disability Working Allowance
The Tax Credits Bill (House of Lords, 1999) proposes to replace DWA
with a Disabled Persons Tax Credit (DPTC), at the same time as
replacing the equivalent benefit for non-disabled people, Family Credit,
with a Working Families Tax Credit. The tax credits will be administered
by the Inland Revenue, rather than the DSS, and eventually paid
through the pay packet rather than as a separate benefit. Few will mourn
the passing of DWA: take-up always fell well below anticipated levels,
and those who did make a claim were generally already in work. The
main differences between the new tax credit and DWA are:11
 More generous income threshold: the level of income up to which
maximum benefit is payable is being increased by £10 per week for
a single person.
                                          
11 Details from Inland Revenue (1998).
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 Less severe taper on income over the threshold: under DWA, benefit is
withdrawn at a rate of 70p in the £ for income above the threshold;
under DPTC the withdrawal rate will be 55p.
 Longer period in which to claim: those whose eligibility for the
benefit depends on previous receipt of another disability benefit
will have longer in which to make a claim for DPTC. Receipt of IB
or IS with a disability premium up to six months prior to the claim
for DPTC will count; the limit for DWA is eight weeks. This
effectively extends the period over which spells of disability will
be regarded as “linked” for the purposes of this benefit.
Whether DPTC will avoid the pitfalls of its predecessor remains to
be seen. However the combined effect of a higher income threshold and
slower withdrawal rate should mean that eligibility for DPTC will
extend to slightly better-paid workers, and reduce the extent to which
additional earnings are clawed back by the benefit system.
Promoting inclusion and welfare to work?
There are aspects of the disability benefit reforms which fit with the
government’s overall ‘welfare to work’ strategy: the appointment of
personal advisers to assist Incapacity Benefit claimants to find work, the
attempt to prevent Jobseekers sliding onto IB, measures to discourage
early retirement on sickness benefits, and extending the scope of
earnings top-ups for disabled workers. There are other aspects which
seem to mesh with an anti-social exclusion philosophy – such as the
extra resources for severely disabled children, and for severely disabled
adults on Income Support.
However there are also reasons to question whether the reforms
will achieve their stated objectives, and a worry that they may have
unintended side effects. Adjusting work incentives is notoriously
difficult and all too often creates other perverse incentives – in this case,
for example, to claim IB immediately on losing a job rather than going
through a period of job-seeking, or to discourage private pension and
insurance provision. Likewise, the move away from social insurance
towards means-testing could be seen as weakening the link between
work and reward, rather than strengthening it. Moreover, as in other
areas of welfare reform, the emphasis on inclusion through paid work
carries with it the danger of further excluding those who are unable to
work – whether because they cannot find a job or because they are
engaged in other activities such as caring. In the case of disability
benefits, the exclusion could take the form of forcing more disabled
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people onto means-tested benefits – through the withdrawal of SDA for
those disabled after the age of 20, and by blocking moves from
unemployment to IB.
The seriousness of these concerns – how many people they would
be likely to affect and by how much – is a matter for further research.
How to trade-off improving work incentives for those able to work and
promoting inclusion of those unable to work – a trade-off which may be
unavoidable where the two categories cannot be differentiated with
certainty – is a matter for political decision.
Re-weighting the benefit basket
The changing balance between means testing, earnings replacement and
extra costs benefits – the ‘benefit basket’ – can perhaps best be illustrated
by taking a number of hypothetical case studies, to see how people in
different circumstances would have been treated by the benefit system at
various points in time, and how they would fare in the future once the
latest reforms come into force.
Figure 5 shows the example of a single man aged 25 living with his
mother who provides full-time support. He has been severely disabled
since birth and neither of them has paid work. The first two bars
represent the amounts, in real terms, they would have received under
the benefit system as it was in 1969, before the introduction of general
disability benefits, and in 1979, after the creation of ‘extra costs’ benefits
but before the reforms of the late 80s and early 90s. The third bar shows
the current situation, and the final bar shows what the impact of the
1999 reforms might be (assuming all benefits continue to be up-rated in
line with prices).
The figure shows that the total amount of benefit income a
household in that situation would receive has risen slowly in real terms,
from £204.27 per week in 1969 to £222.95 in 1998, and would rise further
still to £228.70 under the latest reforms.12 But the composition of that
total has changed markedly – from being entirely means-tested
(Supplementary Benefit), to having just a small (11 per cent) means-
tested top-up. The most significant change came between 1969 and 1979,
with the introduction of earnings replacement benefits in the form of
                                          
12 All amounts have been converted to 1998 prices using the Retail Prices Index.
They do not include Housing Benefit or benefits for local taxes, nor do they
include benefits in kind such as assistance provided by social services.
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Non-Contributory Invalidity Pension and Invalid Care Allowance, and
the creation of extra-costs benefits like Attendance Allowance and
Mobility Allowance. Since then the balance for this family has been
shifting gradually towards more earnings-replacement and less means-
testing, with extra-costs benefits maintaining a steady share. The 1999
reforms would add to the value of the earnings-replacement component
by replacing Severe Disablement Allowance with Incapacity Benefit.
Figure 5: Severely disabled man aged 25
living with full-time carer
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Figure 6 tells a rather different story. It illustrates the situation for
a married woman aged 37, who looks after her 10-year old son, and
suffers from a condition which makes walking difficult. She has a
husband who works full-time. In 1969, the family would have received
no benefit income, because the husband’s earnings would have taken
them above the means-tested minimum. In 1979, they could have
received Housewives Non-Contributory Invalidity Pension and Mobility
Allowance. By 1998 these had become Severe Disablement Allowance
(SDA) and Disability Living Allowance mobility component
respectively, and were slightly more generous than their predecessors,
making a total of £109.90.13 However, under the latest reforms, the
earnings-replacement component of the family’s benefit income (SDA)
would disappear, leaving them with just £35.85 per week in benefit
income.
Figures 5 and 6 have in common the introduction of extra-costs
and earnings-replacement benefits in the 1970s, and their extension in
the following two decades. But the latest reforms affect the two families
very differently: for the young man disabled at birth living with his
                                          
13 Including Child Benefit of £11.45 per week.
Figure 6: Disabled woman with working husband, 
looking after school-age son
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mother, the trend continues, but for the disabled woman looking after
her school-age son, the earnings-replacement component is withdrawn.
Figure 7 has a similar overall shape to Figure 6, with the
introduction and then withdrawal of earnings-replacement benefits, but
through a different mechanism. It represents the situation for a couple
both aged 55; he has recently taken early retirement on ill health
grounds with an occupational pension and she does not work. In 1979
they receive Invalidity Benefit, which by 1998 has become Incapacity
Benefit (IB). (It is paid at a slightly lower rate in 1998, because the wife
no longer counts as an adult dependant. If fact, IB is worth even less to
the couple than is shown in the figure, because it is taxable, unlike its
predecessor.) In 2001, with the Welfare Reform Bill implemented, the
couple’s IB would be set off against their income from the occupational
pension – if the latter was more than £254 per week, they would not
receive any IB.
Figure 7: 55-year old retired on grounds of ill health with 
£16,000 pa occupational pension
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The benefit basket for someone like that depicted in Figure 8 has
changed in a particularly complex way. This shows the benefits received
by a divorced woman aged 22 who has been unemployed since the age
of 19 and has since developed severe depression. She has one child aged
3. In 1969, she would have received a modest means-tested income of
£85.02 per week (in 1998 prices). By 1979, this would have been replaced
by Invalidity Benefit (IVB) and Child Benefit (CB), bringing someone in
her situation up to £120.49 per week. Under current rules, she would
still receive IVB’s successor, Incapacity Benefit (IB), but because of
changes in the way the rate is calculated, it would be worth less, and so
her overall income is slightly lower in real terms, at £105.30 per week.
Finally, under the latest reforms, she would not be entitled to IB, so all
her income (except CB) would come through means-tested Income
Support. The benefit basket in 2001 would be almost identical to what it
was in 1969 – a means-tested minimum – with the small addition of
Child Benefit; the earnings-replacement component has come and gone.
Finally, Figure 9 illustrates the case of a single woman aged 46
who works full-time, and uses a wheelchair and some personal
assistance. In 1969, she would not have received any benefits. By 1979,
extra-costs benefits like Attendance Allowance and Mobility Allowance
Figure 8: Unemployed lone parent with severe depression
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would have brought in £70.33 per week (in 1998 prices), and although
the benefits have changed their names, the amount has remained the
same in real terms. However in 1998 she could receive, in addition, a
means-tested top-up to her earnings in the form of Disability Working
Allowance, bringing her total benefit income up to £97.58 per week,
increasing by £110.02 by 2001, when DWA will have been replaced by
the Disabled Persons Tax Credit. (These calculations assume she works a
30-hour week and is paid at the minimum wage of £3.60 per hour). The
significance of the introduction of extra-costs benefits, and the later
recognition of the labour market disadvantage experienced by disabled
people, is clearly shown in this example.
What these figures cannot indicate is the number of people
affected – how common the different cases illustrated are – nor can it
account for behavioural shifts induced by changes in the rules (for
example, ceasing to be a carer or getting a job). However, they do alert
us to the danger of assuming that either past developments or the latest
reforms have uniform effects. Total benefit income has grown for some
(Figures 5 and 9), but waxed and waned for others. For some families,
means-testing has shrunk (Figure 5), for others it has grown (Figure 9),
and for yet others it disappeared only to return (Figure 8). Earnings
Figure 9: Full-time worker using wheelchair
and personal assistance
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replacement has likewise grown for some (Figure 5) but has fallen and is
even set to be withdrawn for others (Figures 6, 7, and 8). The one finding
which does appear to hold across different families’ circumstances is
that extra-costs benefits, once introduced, have remained a steady and
important component the benefit basket.
Conclusions
This paper has sought to locate the government’s disability benefit
reforms in the context of the historical development of disability benefits
in the UK, drawing out how the treatment by the benefit system of
disabled people in different circumstances has changed over time.
The development of various forms of benefit is best summarised in
Figure 3. Compensatory benefits, the earliest specific disability benefits
to be introduced and the least reformed, have played a steady role,
while extra costs benefits have become an increasingly significant
component. Expansion of benefits designed to replace earnings was
followed by a contraction in the 1990s, the latter phase accompanied by
an increasing emphasis on “targeting”.
The government’s reforms seem to show a continuation of earlier
trends for disabled people in work (Figure 9), and for those who have
been disabled since an early age (Figure 5), both in terms of an
increasing overall level of benefit and in terms of the composition of the
benefit basket. But for disabled people who are unemployed (Figure 8),
‘housewives’ (Figure 6), or early-retired (Figure 7), what the government
is proposing is a step change, with more means-testing and less
earnings-replacement benefits, and in some cases, less benefit overall.
In accordance with the guiding principle of welfare reform, “work
for those who can and security for those who cannot”, the government’s
disability benefit reforms are designed to reward paid employment,
while offering relatively generous provision for those who are obviously
unable to work. The question raised is the extent to which altered
incentives will be sufficiently powerful to eliminate the category in-
between – those who are deemed capable of work but who do not have a
job – or whether large numbers of disabled people will fall between the
stools of “work” and “security”.
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